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Threat Effect of Foreign Direct Investment on Labor Union Wage Premium
Minsik Choi*
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Abstract
This paper explores the impact of “threat effects” of foreign direct investment on
labor markets in the United States. In this context, the term “threat effect” refers to
the use by employers of the implicit or explicit threat that they will move all or part
of their production to a different location, even if they do not actually do so. In this
paper, I construct a unique industry level panel data set and I show that the union
wage premium has been negatively associated with the stock of outward FDI in the
U.S. manufacturing sector for the period of 1983-1996. The union wage premium is
chosen as the dependent variable to test the hypothesis that the increased capital
mobility changes the nature of bargaining between workers and employers as
predicted in threat effect theory.
                                                
*  I am grateful to Jerry Epstein for his support and help throughout the whole process of this study, and
to Michael Ash, Lee Badgett, Sam Bowles, Mark Brenner, Jeannette Lim, Stephanie Luce, and all
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1. Introduction
The last few decades have witnessed growing global economic integration. Most
measures of national openness to the world economy such as the share of import and exports in
the GDP and the share of foreign capital in the domestic capital market have dramatically
increased in both developed and developing countries. Growing numbers of studies
investigating the impacts of this globalization on economic phenomena have drawn attention to
labor market distortions, with an extensive focus on deepening wage inequality between skilled
and un-skilled workers in the U.S. and increasing unemployment in advanced European
economies. These studies concentrate on the question of whether or not the growing
international trade between developed and developing countries serves as the primary cause of
the increasing inequality by investigating the impact of international trade on moving the labor
demand in favor of skilled workers (see Cline, 1997, Slaughter, 1998, Feenstra, 2000 for recent
surveys).
The theoretical basis for these studies is mostly provided by Heckscher-Ohlin’s factor
price equalization theorem. The theorem predicts the decline of wages of unskilled workers in
unskilled-labor-scarce-developed countries due to the decrease in the relative demand for
unskilled labors, which resulted from the trade between skilled-labor-abundant-developed
countries and unskilled-labor-abundant-developing countries. With much of the empirical
works that attempt to find a decrease in demand for unskilled labor in developed countries, the
consensus is that the price changes caused by trade have not been large enough to account for
the trend of wage inequality (see Slaughter, 1999 and Baldwin, 1995, for survey; Wood, 1994,
1998, however, has found larger effects). Not surprisingly, most studies that have closely
studied production integration by outsourcing and foreign direct investment between developed
and developing countries have found contrasting results. While Feenstra and Hanson (1996)
found that the change in outsourcing is positively associated with the change in the skilled
wage share for the period of 1979-1990, Slaughter (2000) reported that multinational
enterprises (MNE) transfer activity did not contribute to the U.S. skill upgrading for the period
of 1973-1994.
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However, fear of the possible negative impact of globalization on the economy of
developed countries, such as the job insecurity of the current workforce has been ever
increasing among the public. According to recent studies of the perceptions of American
workers about globalization (Scheve and Slaughter 2001), even though the majority of
American workers acknowledge gains and benefits from international transactions, they are
concerned with the adverse labor market impacts of the international transactions and they tend
to weight the costs more heavily than the benefits.
Accordingly , several researchers have suggested the need for a new perspective to
investigate the impact of global economic integration, especially international capital mobility.
They argue that the previous studies have attempted to find a decreased relative demand for
unskilled workers, have overlooked the impact of a change in the elasticity of the relative
demand for unskilled/skilled workers on the nature of the bargaining relationship between
workers and employers resulting from economic integration. The new perspective can be
referred to as “Threat effect” – it suggests that the threat by firms to move production abroad,
or the threat to outsource may have an important impact on wages and profits even in the
absence of large price or quantity changes due to changes in the environment of capital
mobility, such as the establishment of NAFTA and WTO. (see Crotty, Epstein and Kelly, 1998;
Rodrik 1997; 1999, other authors who have mentioned threats as potentially important are
Freeman 1995, Slaughter 1998a, and Budd and Slaughter, 2000). Sometimes this is referred to
as the bargaining channel (Reddy 2000).
Among others, the threat effect is well described in Freeman (1995):
It isn’t necessary that the West import the toys. The threat to import them or to move
plants to less-developed countries to produce the toys may suffice to force low-skilled
westerners to take a cut in pay to maintain employment. In this situation, the open economy
can cause lower pay for low-skilled westerners even without trade; to save my job, I accept
Chinese-level pay, and that prevents imports [or moving plants]. The invisible hand would
have done its job, with proper invisibility.1
                                                
1 Words in brackets are added.
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Several theoretical studies explain the effect of strategic foreign direct investment
(FDI) on wage and employment not only in the hosting country, but also in the home country. 2
By using a Nash-Bargaining model, they examine the strategic bargaining relationship between
workers (union) and employers (management) (Rodrik, 1997; 1999; Zhao, 1995; 1998; Bughin
and Vannini, 1994; Naylor and Santoni, 1999). These studies treat outward FDI as the
increasing outside option that the firm could rely on when bargaining with the labor union in
the home country breaks down in a Nash-Bargaining setting. In general, most of these studies
found that an increased outside option had a negative impact on the wage level for union
members. The direction of the impact on employment depends on the union’s utility function
which reflects the union’s policy on employment.
There has been a relative lack of empirical work that tries to prove the threat effect
using quantitative measures. Only a few studies have tried to relate outward foreign direct
investment to the U.S. labor market. For instance, Slaughter (2000) focuses on the effect of
multinational enterprises (MNE) activity measured in various ways on the wage differential
between production (less-skilled) and non-production (more-skilled) workers to test the
hypothesis that MNEs’ transfers have contributed to skill upgrading within U.S. industries. He
finds that most of his measures of MNE transfers have small and imprecisely estimated effects
on the U.S. relative labor demand. In the study of union wage sensitivity to trade and
protection, Gaston and Trefler (1995) include the majority-owned foreign affiliates (MOFA)
employment, i.e. employment outside the U.S. hired by U.S. multinationals from their
majority-owned foreign affiliates as an alternative proxy for the firm’s bargaining strength.
They find that MOFA employment has a negative but not significant impact on the wage
premium in the union sample. However, they did not look at within industry variation since
they looked only one time cross-section variation. Therefore this study is different from Gaston
                                                
2 To answer the question of why firms invest abroad itself is not the main purpose of this study. Since
threat effect results from the very fact that firms can go abroad more easily, it can be utilized no matter
what the firms ’ purposes of abroad investment are. As to the question of why multinational firms go
abroad, studies cite primarily two reasons: (1) access to the markets (horizontal FDI), (2) looking for
factor price differences (vertical FDI). Traditionally, horizontal FDI has been a major form of FDI of US
headquartered multinationals. A recent study finds that vertical FDI is more common  and suggests to
distinguish different types of FDI according to how multinationals ’ strategies respond to government
policy (See Hanson et al, 2001).
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and Trefler (1995) in two aspects: (1) MOFA employment share is treated as a proxy for the
employers’ outside option rather than a proxy for a employer’s bargaining power.3 (2) This
study investigate the within industry variation by using panel data analysis.
This paper will discuss the impact of enhanced capital mobility on the union wage
premium by focusing on the threat effect of foreign direct investment. It attempts to fill in the
gap between the theoretical and empirical work on the threat effect by suggesting one way to
assess the validity of a threat effect and measure its impact through an empirical study. The
impact of the trend of outward FDI of U.S. firms on the trend of union wage premiums during
1983 to 1996 is directly investigated by constructing a unique panel dataset from three well-
known public datasets.
The union wage premium is chosen as the dependent variable to test the hypothesis that
the increased capital mobility as an industry-specific change affects the bargaining outcome or
rent sharing between workers and employers by altering the nature of the bargaining as
predicted in threat effect theory. There are two reasons to focus on union wage premium in this
study. First, the threat effect may occur more explicitly in a bargaining setting as will be
described in the following section so that the union wage premium as direct bargaining
outcomes will be reflected by the threat effect if any. Secondly, in relation to the study of wage
dispersion between skilled and less skilled workers, this study looks further for the relevant
factors that can affect the de-unionization process by decreasing bargaining outcomes among
certain skilled group to investigate the widening wage gap. The study of union behavior has
provided the evidences for the facts that the union has been played important role in narrowing
the wage gap among different groups and therefore de-unionization is an important factor in
explaining the rise in wage inequality (see DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996). By
investigating the impact of capital mobility on the union’s bargaining outcome directly and also
by showing that the union wage premium moves with the wage differentials among less-skilled
workers, we can distinguish the impact of capital mobility on the specific group from the
impact on economy wide.
In this paper the union wage premiums are computed as the inter-industry wage
differential for union members as compared to the average worker in the U.S. manufacturing
                                                
3 The bargaining power is assumed to be constant in a traditional Nash bargaining model.
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sector. In this context the present paper is related to studies that search for valid explanations to
large and persistent inter-industry wage differentials observed in the U.S. in the last few
decades.
To preview the result of this study, the evidence indicates a significant negative impact
of FDI, measured by the MOFA’s employment share in U.S. industry-wide employment, on
union worker’s bargaining outcomes, measured by the inter-industry union wage differential.
Among union members, wages for workers who has only high school education has been more
severely associated with the increase in outward foreign direct investment.
The paper proceeds as follows. Empirical implications are drawn from the theoretical
considerations and a model based on simple Nash bargaining presented in section 2. Section
three describes in detail the data and methods adopted in this study. Section four presents and
discusses the empirical findings. In section five, I will close with some concluding remarks.
2. Theoretical Considerations of the Threat Effect in a Nash-Bargaining Model
2.1 How does the threat effect work?
The threat effect of outward FDI is closely related to the employers’ likelihood of
investing abroad (or moving production facility abroad) and a change in the elasticity of labor
demand rather than an actual shift in labor demand. It is reasonable to assume that the
likelihood of investing abroad is positively associated with the degree of ease with which
investment abroad can be carried out. The degree of ease is closely related to the technological
development in telecommunications and transportation as well as institutional changes such as
NAFTA and the WTO, which facilitate international transactions. If workers’ mobility does not
increase as much as that of employers, employers will take advantage of the unequal mobility
between labor and capital. If there are differences in mobility among workers, it is the less
mobile workers who will be more affected by increased capital mobility. Several studies have
found that more educated workers (skilled workers) are more mobile than less skilled workers
(see Magnani, 1997). More specifically, if an industry has a relatively large share of foreign
affiliates of production, workers in this industry perceive that their employers are more likely to
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invest abroad than their counterparts in an industry that has less shares of production abroad.
When it comes to the bargaining table, labor unions representing workers who are affiliated in
an industry has relatively large likelihood of moving abroad will accept wage cut, so that the
rent they enjoy from the monopoly power of their labor union will be negatively affected. In
the following section, the generalized Nash-bargaining model is presented to understand the
threat effect in broader perspective.
2.2 The Threat Effect in a Nash-Bargaining Model4
In this section, a simple Nash-bargaining model is presented to examine the
implications of the threat effect. Let’s consider a bargaining game between the labor union and
firm-owner.5 The wage and employment are determined only through bargaining process in the
organized labor market and unilaterally by the firm-owner in the competitive labor market.6
The wage level determined in the competitive market is considered to be the reservation wage,
*w  for labor in the organized market. Let f  and f-1  be the bargaining power of labor union
and employer, respectively , and *p for the profit level that the employer could attain by
operating somewhere else, i.e. potential profit level by moving production facilities abroad or
outsourcing. It is *p that is affected by the firm’s accessibility overseas investment, which is
positively associated with the degree of ease with which the relocations or investment can be
                                                
4 The Nash-Bargaining model has been widely used in studies that investigate the impact of openness
(trade, outsourcing, or FDI) on wages and employment in the field of labor economics. The seminal
work on this topic can be found in the efficient contract model in the labor market by McDonald and
Solow (1981). In my paper, Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey’s rent sharing model is used to formulate
the relevant empirical question. Their model is extended to incorporate the employer’s outside option.
This extension can also be also found in Rodrik (1999) and Zhao (1998).
5 The firm-owner represents shareholders, or management who share the interest of maximizing profits.
Employer, the firm-owner, and management are used interchangeably in this paper.
6 In labor economics, there are two types of models that explain bargaining between employers and
unions: (1) the right-to-manage model and (2) the monopoly union model. In the right-to-manage model,
while unions and employers bargain over the wage, employers decide the employment level unilaterally.
In the monopoly union model framework, wage and employment both are bargained. I take the
monopoly union model to draw the empirical implications in this study. See Manning (1987) for a full
survey of these two models.
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carried out. Therefore, the potential profit from relocations, *p , increases as the firm has a
greater access to overseas investment. *p  also increases when trade barriers lower and
transportation and communication costs decrease so that the mobility of production is
enhanced. The stock of FDI is a good proxy for the accessibility of overseas investment, since
the more FDI stock a firm (or an affiliated industry) has, the easier the firm can access outside
options. The maximization problem in a Nash bargaining can be written as follows:
(1) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( )**
,
log-1 log max ppff -+- nwuwu
nw
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The wage is determined by the reservation wage available outside the organized market in the
event of a breakdown in bargaining, the relative bargaining power of the two sides and the
profit level per employee.
Equation (5) implies that:
(6) 0* <¶
¶
p
w
The equilibrium bargaining wage must fall if the firm has more enhanced mobility of
production. The empirical implication of this model is that the more foreign direct investment
the firm has (i.e. the more opportunity of increasing profit level abroad the firm has), less wage
difference above the competitive wage level the workers will receive. Putting it differently,
having more stock of FDI within a firm (or an affiliated industry) will signify the firm’s
increased outside option to the labor union at the bargaining table , and labor unions bargaining
with such firms will make more wage concessions than labor unions facing firms with less
investments abroad. In this study, due to the difficulty of getting firm level data, the industry
takes the role of the firm in the model. The hypothesis to be tested in this study is that, all else
equal, a union representing workers in a firm whose affiliated industry has more outside
options -- as represented by their stock of foreign direct investment abroad – is more likely to
concede in wage bargaining, accordingly members will receive a smaller union wage premium.
3. Empirical Methodology, Data Preview, and Results
3.1 Data Source
To investigate the effect of the trend of outward FDI on the trend of union wage
premiums, an ideal data set would both have individual firm’s finance information including
foreign investments and provide controls for workers’ socio-economic information. However,
since there are no data source of this kind, mainly three different sources of data are used to
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construct a unique industry level panel dataset7: (1) the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group
(MORG) of the Current Population Survey (CPS) data extracted by the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER), (2) U.S. Direct Investment Abroad data collected by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA), and (3) the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Manufacturing Productivity Database.8
 Potential inconsistencies arising from merging three different sources can be an issue
for the credibility of data. However, the data merging practice has been widely used in labor
economics field, and merging data by matching industry codes can be easily done since each
data set reports the conversion rule to Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) categories from
its own. As a result of the matching process, the complete dataset for this study includes 31
manufacturing industries for the period of 1983 to 1996.9 As for the procedure of matching
three different datasets, Census Industry Codes (CIC) of MORG are first converted to Standard
Industrial Classification Codes (SIC). BEA industry classifications (ISI categories) are also
converted to SIC codes.10
3.2 The Methodology and Data Preview
In this study, relative wages and the structure of wages across manufacturing industries
will be examined to determine whether they are correlated with the difference in the average
industry capital mobility measured by the average stock of outward foreign direct investments.
                                                
7 I used United Nations Trade Data to calculate the import penetration defined as
(imports j/(gdpj+imports j+exports j)), where imports j refers to imports in industry j, gdpj refers to domestic
output of industry j, and exports j refers to exports of industry j.
8 CPS MORG data limits the beginning of the time period studied to 1983 because questions about union
status were not included prior to 1983. NBER data is available only up to 1996, and thus limit the end of
the time period studied to 1996.
9 Details for the classification of 31 manufacturing industries are in Appendix I. The BEA has 32
manufacturing industry categories: International Surveys Industry (ISI) Categories. Other Electrical
Machinery (SICs 361, 362, 364, 369) is merged with Electronic Components and Accessories (SIC 367)
in order to match with CPS data in this study. The CPS industry classification (ind 80) does not
distinguish between Other Electrical Machinery from Electronic Components and Accessories.
10 Matching Census data with NBER data has been widely practiced in studies that relate the labor
market outcomes to industry characteristics since there are no alternatives of dataset with both individual
and industry-level data. An additional matching with BEA data is practiced to obtain data for FDI in this
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To do so, I use the two-step regression method. This two-step regression approach is proposed
by Dickens and Katz (1987), and Krueger and Summers (1988) for their studies of inter-
industry wage differentials and has been widely used to study the impact of external economic
changes such as growth of trade and technical change on individuals’ wages and on the inter-
industry wage structure. In the study of inter-industry wage differentials, wages are assumed to
be above the market-clearing wage level. As analyzed in section 2, market can reach non-
clearing wage equilibrium due to some institutional reasons, for instance, collective action
through union, employer’s rent sharing wage setting mechanism, or gift-exchange wage setting
mechanism.
In the first step, the individual earnings are regressed on individual characteristic
variables and socio-economic variables with mutually exclusive industry dummies to calculate
different measures of wage premiums.11 The wage premium will be measured in three different
ways: (1) inter-industry wage differentials by pooling union and non-union members, (2) inter-
industry wage differentials by using only union members, and  (3) inter-industry union wage
differentials by including the interaction terms between industry dummies and union status in
the wage equation. Two different measures of union wage premium are used to check the
sensitivity of the FDI variable to the different specifications.12 Since the union wage premium
is more appropriate to the bargaining model, which is a central idea of this study, than industry
wage differentials, the focus will be on the union wage premium. All inter-industry differentials
in this study are weighted by industry’s employment shares and normalized to compare with
average workers wage level.
Estimating the union/non-union wage differentials itself has long been a highly debated
issue in labor economics. The literature in this field mostly focuses on developing an
appropriate econometric method to estimate the union/non-union wage differential in the
presence of the potential endogeneity of union status (Lewis, 1986). Two methods are widely
                                                                                                                                             
study. The matching NBER productivity dataset with BEA outward foreign direct investment data can
also be found in Slaughter (1995,2000).
11 31 manufacturing industry dummies sorted according to their two or three digit SIC codes.
12 This measure of union wage differential has been used as a proxy for so-called “union rent” by Cebula
and Nair-Reichert (2000). Details about the regression equation will be discussed later.
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used depending on the characteristics and the availability of the data on union status.13 First, an
OLS cross-section method is used based on an exogeneity assumption, i.e., the unobservables
correlated with wages has no correlation with union status. This method has been widely used
in studies that estimate union wage differentials in relation to the industry wage differentials
(among others, Dickens and Katz ,1987; Gaston and Trefler, 1995; Cebula and Nair-Reichert,
2000). Second, the simultaneous equations model has been developed to deal with the
endogeneity of unionism. 14 For instance, among many others, Macpherson and Stewart (1990)
used this method to examine the impact of international competition on union and nonunion
wages.
In this study, an OLS cross-section method and extended method that includes union
status and industry dummy interaction terms are used for estimating the union/non-union wage
differentials for two reasons. First, the OLS cross-section is not only easy to use but also the
results between OLS and two-steps are not really different when calculating a trend. Thus OLS
has been used in many studies that investigate the union wage differential in relation to the
other economic changes as does this study. Second, despite the attractiveness of the
simultaneous equations method, it can not provide useful estimates if the size of the data set is
limited. Because this study only uses data for union workers in the manufacturing sector, the
simultaneous equation method cannot give a consistent regression result.
In the first regression, the log of individual hourly wages is regressed on the socio-
economic variables, demographic variables, and industry dummies to get the first two wage
premiums: (1) industry wage premium from pooled data of union and non-union members, (2)
union wage premium from only union members. Estimated coefficients of industry dummies
represent the wage differentials due to an individual’s industry affiliation in both cases.
(7) J1,...,   ,,...,1   ,)log( ==+++= jIiDHw ijjjihij ebba
                                                
13 A semi-parametric method is also suggested to deal with the endogeneity issue. However, it has not
been widely practiced and the results are similar to two-step methods. See Lanot and Walker (1998).
14 Freeman and Medoff (1981) questioned the usefulness of using the simultaneous method by pointing
out its sensitivity to modifications of specifications.
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where ijw  is the hourly wage of individual i  in industry j , iH is a vector of individual
characteristics and demographic variables, jD is a vector of mutually exclusive dummy
variables indicating industry of affiliation, and ije  is a random error with mean zero and
variance ó2 .15
The extension attempts to calculate the third wage premium, which is interpreted as
“union rent” (for instance, Cebula and Nair-Reichert, 2000). The estimated coefficients of
interaction terms between union status dummy and industry dummies in the cross-section
regression are interpreted as the wage differential due to a worker’s union status and her
industry affiliation. In other words, they are the wage differences earned by a worker who is
covered by a union contract and employed in an industry compared to the workers in an
omitted industry in the manufacturing sector:
(8) J1,...,   ,,...,1   ,)()log( *** ==++++= jIiUDwDHw ijijjjjihij ebba
where  iU  is the union dummy,
16 and everything else is the same as equation (7).
The estimation is restricted to workers aged 16-76 who satisfied sample-selection rules:
(1) the individual was employed in private sector; (2) the individual worked for pay more than
one hour a week; (3) the individual earned more than a dollar and less than 250 dollars an hour;
(4) the individual employed in a manufacturing sector except petroleum industry. 17 Although it
is tempting to include the FDI variable in the above individual earnings equation, it is well
known that the resulting OLS standard errors are incorrect and exaggerate the significance of
the included aggregate variables (Moulton, 1985).
                                                
15 Hj contains schooling, labor force experience, union member, gender, race, marital status, geographic
locations, veteran status, skilled level divided by the occupational categories and interactions terms
between gender and schooling. The coefficients and standard errors of these variables are quite similar to
those of the previous studies and are not reported here.
16 In this study, the workers who are either union members or whose contract is  covered by a collective
bargaining process are classified as being unionized, and iU =1, iU =0 if workers are neither.
17 Petroleum industry is not separated from oil-producing industry in BEA public data so that one can not
separate the data for manufacturing sector from mining industry. An individual employed in oil or gas
related manufacturing industries from CPS data are also excluded in regression.
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The various mean log wage gaps among different group of workers calculated by using
CPS MORG and reported in Table 1. Table 1 shows that wage dispersion between less-
educated workers and more-educated workers increased during sample years and supports
findings from the previous studies. The difference in log hourly wages between workers with a
high school diploma and workers with less than a high school diploma increased to .46 in 1995
from .31 in 1983. At the same time, the wage gap between workers covered by collective
bargaining and workers without collective bargaining decreased. Especially among workers
without a high school diploma, the gap in mean log wages between workers with collective
bargaining and workers without bargaining decreased from .36 to .29. The evidence suggests
that the decrease in collective bargaining outcomes contributed to the increase in wage
dispersion between less educated workers and more educated workers during sample periods.
However, the mean log wage dispersion can be correlated with individual’s socio-economic
characteristics.
The estimated inter-industry union wage differentials and t-ratios from the first step
regressions are reported in table 2. The explanatory power of this model in terms of R-square
values stays between 0.51 and 0.53 throughout the period from 1983 to 1993 and declined to
0.47 for the last three years. The number of observation also declined to less than 29,000 for
these last three years. The statistical significance of these inter-industry union wage coefficients
are consistently at the 5% level except for several years in the cases of industry categories 5, 6,
7, 8, and 14. According to the regression results, for example, if a worker who is employed in a
firm and also a union member (or at least covered by collective bargaining) in beverages
industry (industry category 2) will earn 25% more than a worker who has exactly the same
socioeconomic characteristics but is affiliated to the omitted industries (dairy and meat
industries) in 1983. 18 However, differences in mean log wage gap among different groups can
be associated with worker’s socio economic characteristics.
To see the difference of union wage differentials between skilled and unskilled labor
after controlling the observed workers characteristics that can contribute wage levels, I
estimated the same regression equation using two different groups divided by skill level. In this
study skill is measured by the CPS occupation classifications listed in Appendix 1. The results
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in Table 3 and 4 confirm that unions have generally been regarded as useful to promoting the
interests of unskilled workers (Card, 1996).
Table 5 presents the trend of FDI measured by employment share of Majority Owned
Affiliates (MOFA) in U.S. employment. The average employment share has steadily increased
from 20.6% in 1983 to 22.4% in 1996. Industries have relatively high MOFA employments’
share are Drugs (industry category 5), Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods (6), Motor vehicles and
equipment (19), and Tobacco (21).
Figure 1 illustrates a simple negative relationship between the growth in the industry’s
FDI measured by the employment share and the change of the industry union wage premium.
The numbers that mark each data point correspond to the industry category used in this study.
A simple negative relationship between the union wage premium and FDI shown in Figure 1
implies the regression results. Details about the other variables used in the second step
regression are reported in Appendix 1.
The Second Step
In the second step, several inter-industry wage differentials among different groups of
workers, the coefficients of 31 industry dummies or 31 interaction terms between industry
dummies, and union status are regressed on several industry characteristic variables including
the FDI variable. The coefficients from the first step are interpreted to be the wage premiums
that are not explained by individuals’ characteristics, and are attributed to their affiliation to the
industry:
(9) jtjtfjtpjt FPw hbba +++=
**
where **jtw is the wage premium in industry j, and jtP  is the vector of control variables for
industry characteristics: unionization, rent, capital-labor ratio, unskilled labor share, average
education level of the employee, and average establishment size as well as import penetration
and proxy for technological change, jtF  is the outside option for the industry j measured either
                                                                                                                                             
18 Workers were employed in meat and dairy products are omitted in regressions.
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by the foreign affiliate’s employment share or the capital stock share of  U.S. industry-wide
activity, and t indexes time.
Table 6 reports results form the second step regression. Estimates of OLS and
Instrumental variables method (IV) estimates of equation (9) are reported for union wage
premium specifications.19 The same regressors are included in all specifications. I used both
ordinary least squares and instrumenta l variables method to address the potential endogeneity
of industry unionization. For the instrumental variable, I computed a composite of union
hospitality by weighting the service sector union membership rate by the number of employees
of each industry in 51 different locations (50 states and DC area). For instance, if the Motor
Vehicles and Equipment sector has more employees in Midwest states than anywhere else and
the service sector union membership in these states are higher than anywhere else, the
composite of the union hospitality of the Motor Vehicles and Equipment sector will be
relatively high.
The estimates from OLS are similar but to those of IV in all specifications. The first
and second columns present the OLS and IV method results from the regression of union wage
premium using inter-industry wage differentials among union members. The union wage
premium using the estimates of the interactions terms between union status and industry
dummies are used as dependent variables in the column (3) and (4). The estimates of FDI in all
specifications indicate that higher ratios of the affiliates’ employment share of U.S. industry-
wide employment are significantly associated with lower union wage premiums. Import
penetration ratios, however, are not statistically significant at any conventional level. Estimates
of the proxy for technological change are all positive but not significantly different from zero.
In the case of inter-industry wage differentials using pooled sample (see column 5), the
coefficients of FDI and technology from OLS are positive but not significant at all. The
significantly (at the 5% level) negative coefficients of import penetration ratio suggests that the
firm that is affiliated to an industry where the import penetration level is relatively high, pays
                                                
19 The disturbances  in the second step regressions are heteroscedastic because dependent variables in the
second-step regression equations are estimated coefficients of the first step regressions. I used GLS
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lower wages to its employees than its counterparts in the industry with a low level of import
penetration ratio. Notice that the FDI variable is statistically significant in both OLS and IV
method in the case of union wage premium specifications. This result indicates that the FDI is
not sensitive to the specification.
In specification of inter-industry wage differentials among union members, the result
suggests that, assuming all employees are covered by collective bargaining, a union member
affiliated to an industry with a higher level of FDI is paid less than a union member affiliated to
an industry with a low level of FDI, as is predicted by the bargaining model in the previous
section. The size of the FDI coefficient can also be interpreted by considering that a unionized
worker is shifted from an industry with an average level of FDI abroad (21%) to an industry
with no FDI. The estimated coefficients in the union wage premium specifications (column 1-
4) imply that worker’s union wage premium shows an increase that may range from 3.1% to
7.6% (21% times coefficients). In those industries with the highest levels of FDI such as soap,
cleaners, and toilet goods, the FDI threat effect is significant. For instance, these industries
have an average FDI level of 50.7% and organized workers in these industries earn 18.4%
(50.7% ´ -0.36) less than unorganized workers with the same observable characteristics in
industries with no FDI. The elasticity of union wage premium with respect to FDI ranges from
0.33 to 0.80.
As for the other control variables, the findings of this study are consistent with those of
previous studies.20 The coefficients of unionization in the union wage premium specifications
are significantly positive. Since the elasticity of demand for organized workers tends to be
lower as the unionization increases, the employer will have to pay more to organized labor
(Dickens and Katz, 1987). The inter-industry differentials are also higher in more unionized
industries, which supports the so-called union-threat effect. The firm will pay more to its
employees in a more unionized industry to prevent its employees from being organized
(Dickens, 1985).
                                                                                                                                             
estimation with weights proportional to the covariance matrix of the estimated wage differentials from
the first step regressions. The GLS estimates are very similar to OLS and I report OLS estimates here.
20 Dickens and Katz (1987) provide a comprehensive review of all the existing study of industries wages.
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The positive coefficient of average schooling of employees in the industry in the case
of the inter-industry wage specification suggests that the firm paying higher wages attracts the
better qualified workers even though the higher wages are not set explicitly to compensate
them for their socio-economic characteristics (Dickens and Katz, 1987). The negative
coefficient of unskilled labor share measured by occupation category at the industry level
suggests that the firm affiliated to the industry where the unskilled jobs are relatively greater
has stronger bargaining power so that it can keep the wage relatively lower.
Although coefficients of average establishment size variable in every union wage
premium specifications are significant at the conventional level, they are close to zero. In
previous studies (for instance, Bloch and Kushin, 1978 and Podgursky, 1986), the union wage
premium decreases with establishment size.21
To see the different impact of employer’s mobility on different groups of workers who
are divided according to their union membership and education level, the second step
regression is conducted separately for different groups and the results are reported in table 7.
Among all workers in manufacturing sectors (pooled sample in table 7), higher import
penetration is significantly associated with lower wage level for workers with 12 years
schooling (up to high school diploma), while technological change is positively and
significantly associated with higher wage level. Estimate of FDI variable is not statistically
significant at any level in pooled sample specifications. However, it becomes significantly
negative in union sample specifications. Particularly, the workers with only 12 years schooling
suffer from the decreased bargaining outcome due to the higher outward FDI level while
bargaining outcomes for unionized workers with more than high school educations are not
influenced by the employers’ increased mobility. The import penetration ratio is also an
important factor of reduced union worker’s bargaining outcomes. Note that while import
penetration has negative impact on both inter-industry wage differential and union wage
premium, FDI has negative impact on only union wage premiums. This difference implies that
                                                
21 There are two approaches to explaining why the union/non-union wage differential is affected by
establishment size. First, the threat of unionization is greater in larger nonunion firms so they may give
higher compensation to its employee than smaller firms. Second, bigger firms give high wages to
enhance workers’ effort level, reduce workers’ turnover, or to attract better employees. These two
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outward FDI influences worker’s wage level through the bargaining channel as the threat effect
model suggests, while import does this through demand and supply process directly.
The estimation method used in this study assumes that industry’s outward FDI levels
are randomly distributed and that the change of stock of FDI is independent of industry
characteristics. This exogeneity assumption is a strict assumption. To assess the validity of this
assumption, I regressed the changes in outward FDI on the initial level of union wage
premiums, growth of union wage premium, and other industry characteristics. The results are
reported in table 8 and the results from the regression suggest that industry’s outward FDI is
not significantly associated with the wage premium of union members.
4. Discussion and conclusion
This study has shown that the increased outward investment in U.S. manufacturing
industries has been negatively associated with the wage premium that union members shared
during the period from 1983 to 1996. Unlike previous studies of the impact of FDI on the
workers’ welfare, this study attempts to understand the implicit threat effect of FDI by looking
at the bargaining outcome instead of investigating the change in the relative demand for
unskilled labor. The previous studies have focused on understanding the changes in U.S. labor
demand in favor of skilled labor, and related this phenomenon to changes of trade, outsourcing,
and technology. We may fail to detect important changes in the welfare of unskilled workers if
we narrow our search to such channels. The abundance of anecdotes about the actual
displacement of the traditional worker’s job and the worker’s ever-growing sense of job
insecurity nowadays keep stimulating us to identify the right channel for analysis.
Threat effect theory may lead us to the right channel. This study chooses the
manufacturing sector since blue collar and less educated workers are over-represented in this
sector.22 This study also looks at workers who are covered by collective bargaining to see the
explicit impact of globalization on the bargaining outcome, because workers’ fear, if any, must
                                                                                                                                             
approaches predict the union wage premium is smaller in bigger establishments. Similar findings have
been reported previously.
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affect their performance at the bargaining table. As the threat effect theory suggests, this study
finds that the firm’s enhanced locational mobility due to the globalization process (e.g. the
recent launches of NAFTA and WTO) is effective in pressuring workers, who fear of losing
their jobs, to concede at the bargaining table and accept a lower share of the rent.
                                                                                                                                             
22 23 percent of those with not more than a high-school education, as compared to 14 percent of those
with a college education, were employed in manufacturing sector as of 1987 (Berman et al., 1994).
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Appendix 1 Description of variables, data sources and sample statistics
The union wage premium data are calculated through three different ways as discussed in the
paper.
The Unionization data are calculated by using Freeman and Medoff’s method (1979). Union
membership percentage was calculated as:
100·=
å
å
i
ij
i
ijij
j W
WA
U (A-1)
where jU  is the percentage of workers in industry j who are unionized, ijA  = 1 if worker i is
employed and in a union, and is zero otherwise, ijW  is the CPS sampling weight. The MORG
of CPS data are used for the computation.
The Foreign Direct Investment data are derived by using U.S. Direct Investment Abroad data
from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) manufacturing industry productivity data. The BEA has collected the information
about U.S multinational enterprises through censuses and surveys. Within manufacturing, for
its publicly released data the BEA aggregates parents and affiliates into 32 different industries
in manufacturing sector. Some are individual three-digit SIC industries; others are the sum of
several three-digit or two-digit SIC industries. NBER manufacturing productivity data include
four-digit SIC industries. The actual FDI data are calculated either as the employment share of
Majority-owned non-bank foreign affiliates of non-bank U.S. parent (MOFA)23 in the U.S.
industry wide employment or as the capital stock share of MOFA in the U.S. industry wide
capital stock. 31 manufacturing industry categories are used in this study.
The Import Penetration data are calculated by using United Nation’s Trade Data. The import
penetration is defined as (importsj/(gdpj+importsj+exportsj)), where importsj refers to imports in
industry j, gdpj refers to domestic output of industry j, and exportsj refers to exports of industry
j.
  
The Rent is measured by rent residual based on the method of Leamer et al. (2000) by using
NBER manufacturing industry productivity data:
i
i
ii
Emp
Capital
EMP
EMPwVA
eba +×+=
×-
          (A-2)
where the coefficient a  represents the per-worker cost of non-wage benefits plus average
rents, b  represents the capital-rental costs, and e is the rent residual. Since it is impossible to
separate from the constant that part which represents average rents, I use only the estimated
rent residuals.
                                                
23 Majority-owned affiliates (MOFA) are those in which parents hold at least a 50% ownership stake.
                                                                                                    
22
The Capital Labor Ratio data are computed by using NBER manufacturing industry
productivity data.
The Unskilled Labor Share data are derived as:
100·=
å
å
i
ij
i
ijij
j W
WB
S           (A-3)
where jS  is the percentage of workers in industry j who are unskilled labor, ijB  = 1 if worker
i is employed and unskilled labor and is zero otherwise, ijW  is the CPS sampling weight.
Unskilled worker is defined according to his/her occupation by using the CPS occupation
classification. CPS occupation classification 403-469, 499, and 863-889 are used as the
unskilled occupations. The MORG of CPS data are used for the computation. This method of
classifications is used in Gaston and Trefler (1994).
The Technological Change is measured by the share of engineers and scientists in each
industry. I used the CPS MORG data to calculate. Allen (1996) uses the share of engineers and
scientists in each industry as proxies for the technological change.
The Size is the establishment size defined as log of industry employment divided by the
number of establishments. The NBER manufacturing industry productivity database is used
and the Economic Census data are used for the number of establishments.
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Appendix 2 Industry Classification
IC* Name of Industries (base on BEA classifications) Constituent SIC
1 Grain mill and bakery products 204, 205
2 Beverages 208
3 Other bakery products 206, 207, 209
4 Industrial chemicals and synthetics 281, 282, 286
5 Drugs 283
6 Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods 284
7 Agricultural chemicals 287
8 Other chemical products 285, 289
9 Ferrous Metal 331, 332, 339
10 Nonferrous Metal 333, 334, 335, 336
11 Fabricated metal products 34
12 Farm and garden machinery 352
13 Construction, mining, and materials handling machinery 353
14 Office and computing machines 357
15 Other Machinery
351, 354, 355, 356, 358,
359
16 Household appliances 363
17 Household audio and video, and communication equipment 365, 366
18 Other Electrical Machinery
(including Electronic components and accessories) 361, 362, 364, 367, 369
19 Motor vehicles and equipment 371
20 Other Transportation equipment 372-376, 379
21 Tobacco manufactures 21
22 Textile products and apparel 22, 23
23 Lumber, wood, furniture, and fixtures 24, 25
24 Paper and allied products 26
25 Printing and publishing 27
26 Rubber products 301, 302, 305, 306
27 Miscellaneous plastics products 307
28 Glass products 321-323
29 Stone, clay, and other nonmetallic mineral products 324-329
30 Instruments and related products 38
31 Other Manufactures 31, 39
* Industry Classifications used in this study.
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Figure 1.  Differences between first three years averages and last three years
averages
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Table 1. Logarithm Hourly Wages Differentials in U.S. Manufacturing 1983-1996
Wage differentials ‘83 ‘84 ’85 ‘86 ‘87 ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96
Union - Non-Union Members 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.1 0.09 0.08 0.1 0.11 0.13 0.1 0.1
Union – Non-Union Members
with School 0-11 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.28 0.32 0.3 0.29 0.29 0.29
School 12+ -School 0-11  0.31 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.4 0.44 0.46 0.44
School college –School 0-11 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.5 0.47 0.5 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.55
School college+-School 0-11 0.79 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.81 0.91 0.95 0.95 1.01 1.02 1.08 1.04 1.01
Note: Calculations made by author by using CPS MORG.
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Table 2. Estimated Inter-industry Union Wage Differentials (the third measure of wage premium)
Industry 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1 0.28 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.31 0.21 0.25
(10.10) (8.14) (7.06) (8.00) (6.80) (6.35) (7.30) (7.76) (5.63) (4.97) (5.19) (7.91) (5.45) (5.91)
2 0.25 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.25 0.12 0.21 0.24 0.26
(6.68) (7.74) (7.75) (7.24) (6.28) (6.23) (4.49) (4.15) (3.79) (5.22) (2.63) (3.83) (4.37) (5.08)
3 0.16 0.20 0.11 0.18 0.21 0.16 0.21 0.13 0.15 0.10 0.17 0.18 0.10 0.19
(5.51) (6.63) (3.71) (5.58) (5.99) (4.67) (6.12) (4.03) (4.31) (2.64) (4.33) (4.31) (2.31) (4.10)
4 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.17 0.06 0.07
(2.31) (0.52) (2.35) (2.70) (4.58) (2.54) (0.89) (4.07) (3.05) (3.36) (3.26) (5.10) (1.78) (1.88)
5 -0.09 0.07 0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.05 -0.03 -0.09 0.06 -0.08 0.05 -0.03
(-1.70) (-1.07) (0.89) (-0.20) (0.17) (0.69) (1.22) (1.00) (-0.60) (-1.50) 0.92 (-1.20) 0.70 (-0.50)
6 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.06 -0.01 0.13 0.07 -0.02
(1.90) (2.30) (1.29) (0.48) (1.23) (0.99) (0.25) (1.11) (2.01) (0.95) (-0.20) (2.07) (0.92) (-0.20)
7 0.14 -0.06 0.13 0.01 0.18 -0.05 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.03 0.12
(1.76) -(0.7) (1.41) (0.1) (1.64) -(0.5) (0.87) (1.25) (1.25) (0.79) (0.53) (0.41) (0.16) (0.73)
8 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.09 -0.03 -0.02 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.06
(1.40) (0.72) (1.31) (1.19) (1.12) (1.55) (0.99) (-0.30) (-0.30) (1.73) (1.10) (1.39) (0.85) (0.52)
9 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.15
(5.12) (5.25) (5.21) (5.61) (5.37) (4.19) (4.08) (4.28) (2.42) (2.38) (4.21) (3.67) (2.47) (4.18)
10 0.13 0.15 0.09 0.04 0.13 0.01 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.14 0.10 0.09
(4.67) (5.23) (3.14) (1.43) (4.43) (0.47) (3.14) (2.34) (1.22) (1.15) (1.61) (3.47) (2.54) (2.05)
11 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.14
(8.58) (11.00) (10.70) (10.80) (9.25) (6.70) (6.10) (4.85) (6.94) (4.28) (6.74) (6.21) (4.42) (5.38)
12 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.28 0.24 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.30 0.25 0.26 0.33 0.27
(4.44) (3.14) (2.43) (4.81) (4.47) (3.46) (3.75) (4.62) (4.46) (4.91) (4.09) (3.18) (4.32) (3.38)
13 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.09 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.10 0.18 0.30 0.22
(2.76) (2.73) (2.90) (3.98) (2.22) (4.05) (4.37) (3.75) (3.28) (3.40) (1.93) (3.26) (5.83) (3.54)
14 -0.09 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.08 0.00 -0.08 -0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08
(-2.30) (-0.30) (-0.80) (-0.30) (-0.60) 0.82 (-1.50) 0.00 (-1.40) (-0.50) 0.20 (-0.40) (-0.20) (-0.90)
15 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.15 0.10 0.09
(6.97) (6.93) (6.42) (7.49) (6.99) (5.80) (4.50) (5.97) (5.53) (4.60) (2.29) (6.25) (3.70) (3.16)
16 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.19 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.21 0.15 0.22 0.20 0.09
(3.65) (3.12) (2.63) (2.64) (3.88) (4.44) (2.62) (0.68) (2.27) (3.99) (2.84) (3.36) (2.96) (1.24)
17 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.06 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.11 0.17 0.02 0.10
(4.55) (3.21) (2.27) (3.18) (3.16) (2.14) (1.76) (-0.60) (0.78) (-0.30) (2.43) (3.53) (0.37) (1.89)
18 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.06
(4.27) (6.39) (5.40) (4.53) (3.26) (3.97) (5.63) (4.37) (3.18) (4.31) (4.53) (4.65) (3.91) (1.76)
19 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.27 0.30 0.27
(10.80) (11.50) (13.50) (14.40) (12.90) (14.60) (12.80) (13.50) (12.80) (13.40) (15.80) (14.20) (15.40) (12.60)
20 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.14
(4.06) (6.76) (7.52) (7.12) (4.13) (6.89) (4.31) (2.28) (3.26) (4.32) (5.59) (5.53) (6.90) (4.98)
21 0.16 0.24 0.36 0.23 0.29 0.29 0.36 0.12 0.23 0.47 0.18 0.19 0.27 0.18
(2.45) (3.30) (5.29) (3.18) (4.21) (3.92) (4.23) (1.23) (2.68) (5.60) (2.19) (2.03) (2.33) (1.40)
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22 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.03
(3.42) (3.90) (2.55) (4.27) (2.97) (3.17) (2.10) (1.35) (0.30) (0.70) (2.76) (0.82) (1.10) (0.95)
23 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.19 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.11
(8.77) (9.93) (9.68) (9.62) (6.40) (6.59) (5.47) (6.95) (4.45) (6.91) (4.15) (2.77) (4.10) (3.34)
24 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.14
(8.21) (8.14) (8.48) (8.40) (8.10) (6.43) (7.11) (6.39) (5.80) (5.09) (4.96) (6.49) (4.52) (5.03)
25 0.27 0.30 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.26 0.28 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.19
(14.60) (15.60) (16.10) (14.50) (13.40) (13.40) (11.50) (12.70) (10.10) (11.10) (9.86) (9.03) (9.09) (5.87)
26 0.16 0.09 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.22 0.18 0.18
(4.97) (2.67) (5.36) (4.19) (3.31) (3.07) (3.60) (2.45) (3.74) (3.61) (2.57) (4.84) (3.81) (3.40)
27 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.20 0.19 0.13 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.08 0.01
(3.66) (2.49) (2.50) (5.83) (6.31) (3.69) (1.41) (2.75) (2.02) (1.56) (2.67) (3.58) (2.04) (0.16)
28 0.23 0.21 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.24 0.10 0.15
(5.42) (5.21) (2.47) (3.52) (2.18) (3.29) (1.19) (1.85) (1.92) (1.93) (1.70) (4.73) (1.79) (2.83)
29 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.17 0.10 0.09 0.15
(7.45) (5.63) (5.74) (7.38) (5.74) (4.55) (5.5) (4.12) (3.96) (5.49) (4.47) (2.36) (2.23) (3.34)
30 -0.04 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.16 0.12
(-1.40) (-0.10) (1.72) (2.45) (1.77) (1.06) (-0.10) (1.74) (0.18) (2.12) (1.22) (2.02) (3.29) (2.14)
31 0.08 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.10 0.18 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.10
 (2.53) (3.15) (4.52) (2.88) (2.83) (5.13) (2.55) (4.64) (2.78) (2.50) (2.60) (2.60) (2.59) (1.96)
N* 34446 36011 36234 35593 35100 33224 33668 34489 32601 31230 30064 28765 28299 24481
Note: T-ratios in parenthesis
*: Number of observations in CPS MORG
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Table 3. Inter-Industry Union Wage Differentials among Unskilled Labor
Industry 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1 0.334 0.239 0.233 0.273 0.255 0.227 0.274 0.249 0.209 0.191 0.182 0.375 0.232 0.233
2 0.31 0.327 0.276 0.264 0.263 0.291 0.219 0.192 0.213 0.233 0.136 0.241 0.228 0.289
3 0.19 0.268 0.186 0.262 0.245 0.242 0.262 0.185 0.216 0.136 0.201 0.267 0.196 0.242
4 0.031 -0 0.02 0.045 0.127 0.084 0.029 0.101 0.079 0.104 0.079 0.153 0.065 0.111
5 -0.08 0.132 0.023 -0.05 -0 0.059 0.039 0.108 -0.04 -0.13 0.053 -0.03 0.031 0.036
6 0.118 0.108 0.113 0.036 0.166 0.099 0.104 0.138 0.186 0.224 0.089 0.178 0.059 0.023
7 -0.01 -0.06 0.068 -0.01 0.149 -0.01 -0.06 0.211 0.096 0.158 -0.01 0.057 -0.05 0.14
8 0.069 0.073 0.071 0.107 0.011 0.099 0.12 -0.03 0.055 0.133 0.088 0.187 0.08 -0.1
9 0.118 0.097 0.14 0.121 0.142 0.136 0.104 0.095 0.081 0.075 0.082 0.153 0.094 0.143
10 0.147 0.136 0.104 0.061 0.145 0.028 0.11 0.067 0.041 0.074 0.068 0.152 0.126 0.113
11 0.164 0.197 0.207 0.225 0.174 0.141 0.141 0.112 0.143 0.116 0.175 0.164 0.137 0.151
12 0.258 0.242 0.187 0.305 0.293 0.219 0.25 0.259 0.29 0.308 0.26 0.217 0.375 0.285
13 0.152 0.098 0.157 0.177 0.083 0.238 0.189 0.122 0.139 0.128 0.168 0.174 0.31 0.254
14 -0.01 0.053 0.029 -0.03 -0.02 0.218 -0.02 0.058 -0.01 -0.02 0.069 0.175 0.04 -0.01
15 0.131 0.12 0.106 0.115 0.131 0.106 0.086 0.131 0.117 0.107 0.07 0.143 0.094 0.083
16 0.145 0.135 0.11 0.141 0.144 0.154 0.158 0.086 0.166 0.226 0.157 0.274 0.183 0.135
17 0.192 0.156 0.122 0.204 0.127 0.177 0.115 -0 0.152 0.1 0.159 0.26 0.12 0.195
18 0.116 0.172 0.148 0.129 0.134 0.113 0.173 0.139 0.118 0.14 0.157 0.184 0.169 0.092
19 0.203 0.183 0.217 0.257 0.238 0.27 0.245 0.269 0.264 0.273 0.305 0.296 0.325 0.29
20 0.127 0.153 0.177 0.164 0.112 0.146 0.139 0.086 0.128 0.149 0.173 0.196 0.26 0.234
21 0.215 0.226 0.4 0.264 0.288 0.257 0.224 0.213 0.264 0.511 0.067 0.108 0.186 0.051
22 0.078 0.083 0.061 0.099 0.082 0.074 0.072 0.037 0.041 0.044 0.092 0.054 0.036 0.066
23 0.17 0.187 0.208 0.206 0.148 0.151 0.123 0.175 0.117 0.189 0.117 0.101 0.125 0.115
24 0.169 0.171 0.154 0.166 0.189 0.15 0.165 0.183 0.159 0.114 0.138 0.174 0.16 0.192
25 0.216 0.228 0.238 0.22 0.212 0.228 0.195 0.25 0.157 0.251 0.222 0.181 0.207 0.145
26 0.189 0.083 0.209 0.181 0.093 0.109 0.141 0.091 0.157 0.14 0.123 0.211 0.175 0.172
27 0.122 0.121 0.104 0.222 0.23 0.148 0.053 0.144 0.105 0.072 0.111 0.164 0.121 0.031
28 0.242 0.174 0.117 0.125 0.092 0.166 0.108 0.146 0.114 0.064 0.108 0.215 0.116 0.173
29 0.214 0.173 0.179 0.24 0.217 0.16 0.176 0.14 0.153 0.187 0.144 0.071 0.095 0.168
30 -0.06 -0.01 0.096 0.096 0.07 0.082 0.066 0.098 0.022 0.103 0.11 0.099 0.164 0.124
31 0.154 0.149 0.205 0.157 0.149 0.227 0.157 0.228 0.134 0.141 0.131 0.141 0.177 0.163
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Table 4 Inter-Industry Union Wage Differentials among Skilled Labor
Industry 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1 0.202 0.183 0.209 0.253 0.299 0.265 0.179 0.164 0.203 0.145 0.096 0.288 0.149 0.228
2 0.077 0.21 0.102 0.101 0.18 0.085 -0.072 -0.003 0.117 -0.023 -0.162 0.128 -0.069 0.152
3 0.155 0.359 0.079 0.181 0.151 0.177 0.171 0.031 0.13 -0.048 0.018 0.164 0.085 0.306
4 -0.029 -0.092 -0.021 -0.047 -0.021 -0.037 -0.07 0.009 -0.009 0.012 -0.026 0.009 -0.055 -0.007
5 -0.038 -0.022 0.053 0.037 -0.229 -0.006 -0.163 -0.052 -0.168 -0.075 -0.059 -0.086 0.051 -0.202
6 -0.215 0.006 -0.011 0.026 -0.022 -0.074 0.09 0.032 0.204 0.171 -0.07 0.194 -0.28 -0.511
7 -0.235 -0.281 -0.074 -0.077 -0.234 0.196 -0.342 -0.254 -0.234 0.293 -0.036 0.065 0.133 -0.227
8 -0.432 -0.333 -0.156 0.093 -0.19 -0.049 0.275 -0.196 -0.316 -0.364 0.055 0.304 -0.118 -0.171
9 -0.016 0.032 -0.008 0.021 0.011 0.03 -0.051 -0.017 0.024 -0.023 0.001 0.083 -0.045 0.115
10 0.041 0.101 -0.03 0.019 0.002 -0.126 -0.046 -0.064 0.031 0.037 -0.052 0.031 0.049 0.18
11 0.136 0.115 0.169 0.15 0.134 0.132 0.124 0.091 0.06 0.098 0.155 0.153 0.064 0.143
12 0.175 0.231 0.035 0.289 0.347 0.123 0.143 -0.004 0.193 0.515 0.219 0.277 0.203 0.22
13 0.053 0.007 0.093 0.244 0.062 0.122 0.22 0.037 0.098 0.121 0.221 0.204 0.23 0.164
14 -0.103 -0.014 -0.033 0.041 -0.044 0.179 -0.15 0.047 -0.257 -0.123 -0.046 0.367 -0.098 0.065
15 0.06 0.056 0.071 0.073 0.081 0.072 0.041 0.103 0.084 -0.012 0.034 0.101 0.032 0.079
16 0.109 0.088 0.108 0.045 0.093 0.033 0.111 0.05 0.059 0.212 0.126 0.257 0.258 0.131
17 0.076 0.056 0.091 0.17 0.087 0.174 0.075 0.045 0.141 0.043 0.117 0.225 0.212 0.304
18 0.08 0.135 0.115 0.102 0.11 0.103 0.166 0.114 0.095 0.137 0.07 0.172 0.199 0.14
19 0.048 0.078 0.058 0.105 0.069 0.094 0.136 0.037 0.181 0.139 0.167 0.234 0.238 0.202
20 0.074 0.108 0.118 0.08 0.053 0.054 0.081 0.048 0.061 0.081 0.147 0.097 0.214 0.205
21 0.334 0.033 0.373 0.445 0.254 0.288 0.363 0.002 0.456 0.411 -0.102 -0.046 0.282 0.021
22 0.083 0.065 -0.033 0.077 0.035 0.02 0.022 -0.017 -0.048 -0.069 0.019 0.014 0.03 0.032
23 0.079 0.188 0.161 0.105 0.123 0.09 0.125 0.148 0.187 0.17 0.222 0.12 0.22 0.104
24 0.033 0.02 0.049 0.041 0.106 0.013 0.042 0.071 0.033 0.003 0.082 0.159 0.093 -0.07
25 0.059 0.147 0.163 0.175 0.108 0.04 0.144 0.199 0.067 0.058 0.066 0.018 0.102 0.099
26 -0.002 0.006 0.118 0.009 -0.174 -0.17 0.066 0.035 0.002 0.007 -0.061 -0.047 -0.021 0.079
27 0.071 0.018 0.046 0.11 0.102 0.074 0.019 0.088 0.093 0.03 0.058 0.102 0.042 -0.01
28 0.199 0.216 0.161 -0.075 0.082 -0.022 -0.108 0.118 0.117 -0.078 0.043 0.164 0.025 0.075
29 0.284 0.142 0.129 0.205 0.118 0.095 0.121 0.145 0.162 0.073 0.059 0.013 0.15 0.026
30 -0.076 -0.005 0.072 0.103 0.042 0.123 -0.007 0.029 -0.068 0.031 0.041 0.126 0.296 0.011
31 0.125 0.112 0.299 0.139 0.092 0.134 0.133 0.337 0.045 0.113 0.049 0.212 0.196 0.04
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Table 5. Trend of FDI measured by employment share among 31 manufacturing industries in the U.S.
Industry 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1 0.237 0.197 0.226 0.247 0.239 0.232 0.187 0.185 0.18 0.18 0.202 0.228 0.19 0.174
2 0.225 0.21 0.169 0.177 0.152 0.158 0.184 0.192 0.207 0.251 0.279 0.342 0.257 0.245
3 0.288 0.306 0.292 0.291 0.284 0.205 0.273 0.316 0.353 0.365 0.385 0.37 0.373 0.384
4 0.266 0.266 0.274 0.274 0.275 0.281 0.276 0.268 0.268 0.265 0.258 0.282 0.28 0.299
5 0.496 0.492 0.507 0.504 0.505 0.5 0.454 0.48 0.484 0.476 0.455 0.445 0.454 0.463
6 0.468 0.463 0.472 0.488 0.486 0.473 0.492 0.509 0.53 0.535 0.54 0.547 0.545 0.553
7 0.192 0.178 0.184 0.207 0.209 0.207 0.184 0.171 0.164 0.16 0.149 0.2 0.226 0.182
8 0.277 0.273 0.271 0.264 0.248 0.251 0.274 0.261 0.264 0.28 0.266 0.278 0.272 0.293
9 0.043 0.043 0.046 0.045 0.039 0.027 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.016 0.018 0.03 0.034 0.035
10 0.076 0.074 0.082 0.085 0.078 0.074 0.078 0.108 0.104 0.103 0.115 0.115 0.104 0.111
11 0.096 0.093 0.092 0.093 0.09 0.088 0.09 0.089 0.087 0.084 0.081 0.075 0.073 0.094
12 0.236 0.225 0.237 0.283 0.242 0.216 0.218 0.206 0.118 0.147 0.126 0.139 0.122 0.129
13 0.24 0.232 0.242 0.26 0.289 0.265 0.259 0.261 0.257 0.223 0.207 0.237 0.224 0.248
14 0.28 0.298 0.311 0.331 0.338 0.345 0.445 0.476 0.477 0.473 0.468 0.477 0.483 0.482
15 0.111 0.11 0.106 0.112 0.104 0.1 0.113 0.108 0.112 0.113 0.108 0.11 0.105 0.11
16 0.314 0.278 0.307 0.37 0.417 0.345 0.398 0.412 0.387 0.4 0.396 0.336 0.318 0.328
17 0.186 0.183 0.169 0.08 0.068 0.057 0.112 0.125 0.121 0.122 0.128 0.265 0.307 0.249
18 0.235 0.233 0.231 0.233 0.226 0.23 0.231 0.258 0.268 0.265 0.262 0.326 0.325 0.301
19 0.447 0.422 0.43 0.428 0.404 0.421 0.437 0.444 0.461 0.421 0.405 0.399 0.395 0.415
20 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.032 0.029 0.03 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.027 0.028 0.034 0.037 0.042
21 0.426 0.423 0.411 0.402 0.423 0.442 0.484 0.519 0.529 0.572 0.597 0.61 0.653 0.64
22 0.035 0.036 0.038 0.041 0.038 0.039 0.047 0.048 0.052 0.058 0.055 0.055 0.058 0.066
23 0.022 0.019 0.02 0.016 0.014 0.015 0.03 0.038 0.037 0.039 0.043 0.048 0.047 0.053
24 0.135 0.137 0.135 0.131 0.134 0.146 0.17 0.183 0.174 0.173 0.157 0.159 0.167 0.162
25 0.022 0.024 0.022 0.02 0.019 0.02 0.021 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.022 0.027 0.026 0.029
26 0.351 0.354 0.354 0.367 0.347 0.337 0.275 0.273 0.262 0.241 0.239 0.245 0.23 0.242
27 0.071 0.068 0.069 0.075 0.072 0.072 0.065 0.072 0.069 0.067 0.071 0.066 0.069 0.072
28 0.158 0.162 0.154 0.162 0.145 0.155 0.17 0.179 0.17 0.15 0.162 0.14 0.148 0.158
29 0.087 0.082 0.085 0.089 0.08 0.082 0.087 0.083 0.086 0.079 0.077 0.082 0.078 0.075
30 0.184 0.183 0.185 0.187 0.198 0.203 0.142 0.15 0.156 0.152 0.152 0.15 0.164 0.168
31 0.16 0.177 0.166 0.165 0.123 0.121 0.091 0.109 0.108 0.129 0.115 0.128 0.125 0.138
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Table 6. Wage Premium Regressions Results
Union wage premium Ia Union Wage Premium IIb Inter-Industry
Wage Premium
Dependent Variable
OLS
(1)
IV
(2)
OLS
(3)
IV
(4)
OLS
(5)
-0.148** -0.296** -0.278** -0.364** 0.183Share of the U.S. foreign
direct investment abroad (0.064) (0.115) (0.072) (0.114) (0.038)
Imports -0.011 -0.054 0.006 -0.019 -0.045**
(0.036) (0.051) (0.041) (0.050) (0.022)
Technology 0.208 0.098 0.240 0.176 0.062
(0.156) (0.203) (0.177) (0.199) (0.094)
0.229** 1.367** 0.208** 0.867 0.157**Unionization
(0.080) (0.660) (0.092) (0.648) (0.049)
0.0004 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0003Rent
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0407) (0.0008) (0.0004)
-0.003 -0.010 -0.009 -0.014 -0.002Capital/labor ratio
(0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.011)
-0.441** -0.547** -0.098 -0.159 -0.280**Unskilled labor share
(0.131) (0.172) (0.149) (0.169) (0.097)
0.005 0.053 -0.032** -0.004 0.022**Schooling
(0.014) (0.033) (0.016) (0.032) (0.008)
-0.0003** -0.0007** -0.0005** -0.0007* 0.000Average establishment
size (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.000)
-0.014 -0.905 0.0637 0.121 -0.178Intercept
(0.211) (0.573) (0.240) (0.562) (0.153)
R2 0.87 0.81 0.74 0.70 0.93
Note
a inter-industry wage differentials among union members.
b Coefficients of interaction terms between industry dummies and union status dummy in log wage equations.
1. Estimated by two-way-fixed effect model (i.e with both group and period effect)
2. Coefficients with * and **are statistically significant at the 10% and 5% level respectively. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
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Table 7. Wage Premium among different groups
Pooled sample Union sampleaDependent Variable
All 0-12 Years
Schooling
12+
Schooling
All 0-12 Years
Schooling
12+
Schooling
0.183 0.030 0.041 -0.296** -0.439** 0.006Share of the U.S. foreign
direct investment abroad (0.038) (0.048) (0.053) (0.115) (0.176) (0.223)
Imports -0.045** -0.092** -0.033 -0.054 -0.239** 0.049
(0.022) (0.027) (0.030) (0.051) (0.085) (0.109)
Technology 0.062 0.038 0.272** 0.098 0.364 0.190
(0.094) (0.117) (0.128) (0.203) (0.281) (0.356)
0.157** 0.063 -0.003 1.367** 2.447** -0.972Unionization
(0.049) (0.059) (0.065) (0.660) (1.107) (1.407)
0.0003 -0.0004 0.001** 0.0006 -0.0002 0.003*Rent
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.001) (0.0016)
-0.002 -0.004 0.009 -0.010 -0.035 0.01Capital/labor ratio
(0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.022) (0.039) (0.043)
-0.280** - - -0.547** - -Unskilled labor share
(0.097) (0.172)
0.022** - - 0.053 - -Schooling
(0.008) (0.033)
0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.0007** -0.001** -0.0003*Average establishment
size (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0006)
-0.178 -0.117 -0.158* -0.905 0.544 -0.250Intercept
(0.153) (0.193) (0.093) (0.573) (0.371) (0.471)
R2 0.93 0.88 0.47 0.81 0.60 0.56
Note:
a IV method used for union sample.
1. Estimated by two-way-fixed effect model (i.e with both group and period effect)
2. Coefficients with * and **are statistically significant at the 10% and 5% level respectively. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
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Table 8 Regression of Change in outward FDI on union wage premium growth
Dependent Variable Change in FDI
Union Wage Premium Growth -0.027 -0.026
(0.020) (0.020)
Initial Union Wage Premiums 0.028 0.027
(0.019) (0.019)
Constant -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
R-Squared 0.11 0.12 0.12
Observations 403 403 403
Note: Industry and year dummies are included in all specifications.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
